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Abstract To investigate how economic conditions and crises affect mortality and its 
predictability in industrialized countries, we review the related literature, and we fore-
cast mortality developments in Spain, Hungary, and Russia—three countries which 
have recently undergone major transformation processes following the introduction 
of radical economic and political reforms. The results of our retrospective mortality 
forecasts from 1991 to 2009 suggest that our model can capture major changes in 
long-term mortality trends, and that the forecast errors it generates are usually smaller 
than those of other well-accepted models, like the Lee-Carter model and its coherent 
variant. This is because our approach is capable of modeling (1) dynamic shifts in sur-
vival improvements from younger to older ages over time, as well as (2) substantial 
changes in long-term trends by optionally complementing the extrapolated mortality 
trends in a country of interest with those of selected reference countries. However, 
the forecasting performance of our model is limited (like that of every model): e.g., if 
mortality becomes extremely volatile—as was the case in Russia after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union—generating a precise forecast will depend more on luck than on 
methodology and expert judgment. In general, we conclude that, on their own, recent 
economic changes appear to have minor effects on life expectancy in industrialized 
countries, but that the effects of these changes are greater if they occur in conjunction 
with other major social and political changes.
Keywords Economic conditions · Crisis · Life expectancy · Projections · Spain · 
Hungary · Russia
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Einfluss ökonomischer Transformationsprozesse auf die Sterblichkeit 
und ihre Vorhersagbarkeit
Zusammenfassung Um den Einfluss ökonomischer Bedingungen und Krisen auf 
die Sterblichkeit und ihre Vorhersagbarkeit in industrialisierten Ländern zu unter-
suchen, geben wir einerseits einen Einblick in bisherige Forschungsergebnisse und 
andererseits prognostizieren wir die Sterblichkeit in Spanien, Ungarn und Russland, 
drei Länder, die große Transformationsprozesse (inklusive ökonomischer und poli-
tischer Reformen) in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erlebt haben. Die retrospekti-
ven Sterblichkeitsprognosen von 1991 bis 2009 zeigen, dass unser Prognosemodell 
Veränderungen im Langzeittrend einfangen kann und dass die Abweichungen von 
der tatsächlich eingetroffenen Sterblichkeitsentwicklung häufig geringer sind als 
die anderer weit verbreiteter Modelle (wie z. B. das Modell von Lee und Carter). 
Zwei methodische Besonderheiten scheinen dafür (ganz besonders) verantwortlich 
zu sein: Erstens kann unser Modell die dynamische Verschiebung starker Sterb-
lichkeitsverbesserungen von jungen zu hohen Altern über die Zeit einfangen und 
zweitens kann es wesentliche Veränderungen im Langzeittrend modellieren, indem 
es optional den extrapolierten Trend in einem Land um extrapolierte Trends ausge-
wählter Referenzländer ergänzt. Gleichwohl kann aber auch die Vorhersageleistung 
unseres Modells unter bestimmten Prognosebedingungen limitiert sein: Wenn sich 
z. B. der Sterblichkeitstrend sehr sprunghaft verändert (wie z. B. in Russland in der 
Zeit nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion), dann scheint eine genaue Vorhersage 
eher von Zufall als von methodischer und demografischer Expertise abzuhängen. 
Die vorliegende Analyse deutet generell darauf hin, dass der alleinige Einfluss öko-
nomischer Veränderungen auf die Lebenserwartung bei Geburt in industrialisierten 
Ländern eher klein zu sein scheint, sich dieser aber erhöhen kann sobald er mit 
anderen sozialen und politischen Transformationsprozessen einhergeht.
Schlüsselwörter Ökonomische Bedingungen · Krisen · Lebenserwartung · 
Prognosen · Spanien · Ungarn · Russland
1  Introduction
Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) have shown that for well over a century female record life 
expectancy has been increasing by approximately 2.5 years per decade, or by about 
6 h per day. However, as Fig. 1 illustrates, from 1950 to 2009 there have been sub-
stantial differences in the development of life expectancy for women (solid lines) and 
men (dashed lines) across the countries of Europe, as well as in Australia, Japan, and 
the United States. Moreover, while highly developed countries have generally seen 
steady increases in life expectancy in recent decades, the mortality patterns in many 
countries of central and Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century 
have been irregular, as progress was interrupted by periods of stagnating and even 
decreasing life expectancy. For instance, in 2009 Japan (black) held the record for life 
expectancy, at 86.4 years for women and 79.6 years for men; while life expectancy 
in Russia (green) lagged far behind, at only 74.7 years for women and 62.73 years 
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for men. Like Japan, Spain experienced a rapid increase in life expectancy between 
1950 and 2009. Meanwhile, between 1965 and 1990, Hungary, like Russia, saw only 
small improvements in survival, and even registered increases in mortality. Yet unlike 
Russia, Hungary has been catching up to international trends since the early 1990s.
In light of these trends, the following question arises: Which factors affect mor-
tality per se, and which factors had the greatest impact in the last 50 years? The 
scale of mortality fundamentally depends on both individual and structural factors. 
These individual factors include socioeconomic characteristics like age, sex, educa-
tion, and occupation; and lifestyle choices such as diet, physical exercise, and smok-
ing. Among the structural factors are conditions related to standard of living, access 
to education and health care, employment, and distribution of income and wealth. 
Although it is difficult to disentangle the influence of each of these factors on mortal-
ity, it is clear that their effects vary over time. Improvements in public health, such 
as water purification and hygiene, raised the standards of living in many developed 
countries up to the 1930s (Cutler et al. 2006). Socioeconomic conditions might play 
a larger role today.
In this article, we investigate the impact of economic changes on mortality and 
how the effects of these changes may become stronger in the presence of major politi-
cal and social changes. We have chosen to focus on Spain, Russia, and Hungary; 
three developed countries which have recently undergone major political and eco-
nomic transitions to, for example, democracy or capitalism. Such transitions typi-
cally differ in terms of their balance of political and economic reforms, their pace and 
severity, and their sustainability. While Spain moved directly from being governed 
by a military dictatorship to democratic rule in the 1970s (Mackenbach et al. 2013), 
the trajectories of political and economic reforms in countries affected by the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union—including Hungary and especially Russia—were less 
straightforward (Grigoriev et al. 2010). In central and eastern Europe, rising income 
inequality, a deteriorating social safety net, and increasing material hardship (Bobak 
et al. 1998 2000) might have led to elevated levels of psychosocial stress. Mortality 
Fig. 1 Observed life expectancy 
at birth (e0) for women (solid 
lines) and men (dashed lines) 
in 30 countries of the Human 
Mortality Database (2013) from 
1950 to 2009. The trajectories 
for Japan, Hungary, Spain, 
and Russia are highlighted in 
black, red, blue, and green; 
respectively
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in these countries, and especially in Russia, also increased due to excessive alcohol 
consumption, accidents, and cardiovascular diseases (Leon 2007; Shkolnikov and 
Cornia 2000; Shkolnikov et al. 2004).
Forecasting mortality is difficult per se since we cannot know with any certainty 
what will happen in the future. But generating such forecasts becomes particularly 
challenging if mortality develops irregularly, as it typically does in countries after 
major transformation processes. In this article, we employ our mortality forecasting 
model (Bohk and Rau 2014a), which is a flexible framework that can be applied to 
forecast regular as well as irregular mortality developments. For instance, our model 
can capture substantial changes in long-term trends by optionally complementing 
extrapolated mortality trends in a country of interest with those of selected refer-
ence countries. To test the forecasting performance of our model under challenging 
conditions, we have generated (retrospective and prospective) mortality forecasts 
for Spain, Hungary, and Russia. We then assessed the forecasts of our model by 
comparing the results with (1) the observed mortality development (at least in the 
retrospective setting) as well as with (2) the results of other well-accepted mortal-
ity forecasting models; in this case, with the model of Lee and Carter (1992) and its 
coherent variant of Li and Lee (2005).
2  Economic impact on mortality
Preston (1975, 2007) analyzed the impact of economic conditions on the level of mor-
tality, assuming that higher income per capita allows people to spend more money 
on health-related goods and services like food, housing, leisure, and education. He 
applied a logistic model to describe the relationship between income per capita and 
life expectancy at birth for many countries all over the world in three periods: i.e., 
1900, 1930, and 1960. He found that countries with a higher income per capita also 
have a higher life expectancy. Although Preston’s main focus was on economic con-
ditions, he also observed that progress in life expectancy was influenced by factors 
like living standards, vaccines, and antibiotics, at least in the first half of the twenti-
eth century. Figure 2 depicts this global relationship between higher gross national 
incomes and higher life expectancy for 236 countries in 2011. Comparing economic 
growth across countries and linking it to mortality is, however, often fraught with 
difficulties. For instance, Nesporova (2000) and Fleming et al. (2000) emphasized 
the role of the shadow (or informal) economy, which may have accounted for around 
25 % of all economic activity in transition countries like Hungary and Russia in the 
early 1990s; whereas Sen (1998) has observed that increases in life expectancy may 
be attributable not only to GNP per capita, but also to the availability of public health 
services and to poverty reduction. To compare levels of income across countries, we 
have nonetheless chosen to apply the gross national income converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates (GNI per capita, PPP). For instance, in 
2011 the highly developed country of Norway had a relatively high GNI per capita 
and a PPP rate of approximately 61,390 international dollars. Norway also had, at 81 
years, a life expectancy that was 12 years higher than that of Russia, a country which 
had a relatively low GNI per capita and a PPP rate of approximately 21,700 interna-
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tional dollars. Indeed, Fig. 2 shows that countries with a higher GNI have a higher 
life expectancy than countries with a lower GNI. But Fig. 2 also shows that this 
global relationship is curvilinear, which implies that the economic impact weakens 
once a certain level of life expectancy has been reached (“inelasticity”).
Since our focus is on industrialized countries, we review studies that investigate 
the (weakening) influence of economic conditions on further gains in life expec-
tancy from different perspectives. For instance, Wilkinson (1990, 1992) showed that 
socioeconomic inequalities—as indicated by, for example, relative poverty—influ-
ence public health more strongly than economic growth (via increasing income per 
capita). These findings are in line with those of previous research by Rodgers (1979), 
who stressed the positive association between high levels of socioeconomic inequal-
ity and elevated mortality. Christensen et al. (2009) and Lee and Mason (2011) gave 
demographic explanations for the weakening influence of economic conditions on 
the progress of life expectancy in developed countries over time: while past mortal-
ity reductions resulted in a larger share of people of working age, and therefore in 
economic growth and increasing GDP per capita; recent mortality reductions have 
resulted in a higher share of people of retirement age, and therefore in less economic 
growth and smaller increases in GDP per capita. Prolonged lives, coupled with a 
larger share of older people in the population, tend (1) to reverse the direction of 
intergenerational transfers (from elderly to young), and (2) to increase the pressure 
on the social welfare system, since fewer people of working age have to support 
more and more retired elderly people. The redistribution of work (including a rise 
in the retirement age), as well as increased productivity (including investments in 
health-related education, medical technology, and innovations) might be two strate-
gies for overcoming the socioeconomic consequences of this demographic transition. 
Whereas these studies sought to attribute the weakening economic impact on mor-
tality to socioeconomic inequality and demographic aging from a period perspec-
tive, other scholars have examined the extent to which mortality in later life can be 
affected by economic conditions early in life from a cohort perspective. For example, 
Fig. 2 Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita, PPP (in cur-
rent international dollars) and 
life expectancy at birth (e0) for 
236 countries in 2011. We depict 
highly developed countries from 
the Human Mortality Database 
(2013) in black and central and 
eastern European countries (that 
formerly belong to the Warsaw 
Pact) in red. Data are from 
the International Comparison 
Program database (World Bank 
2013)
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van den Berg et al. (2006, 2009) used data for Dutch and Danish birth cohorts in the 
nineteenth century to show that individuals born in a recession have fewer years of 
remaining life expectancy at advanced ages than individuals born in a boom. More 
recent studies have also presented evidence that economic conditions in early life 
affect particular kinds of health conditions at advanced ages, especially those related 
to cardiovascular health and cognitive abilities (Doblhammer et al. 2013; van den 
Berg et al. 2011). According to these studies, individuals born in a boom have sig-
nificantly better cognitive abilities and are less likely to suffer from cardiovascular 
diseases than individuals born during a recession. Barker (1990, 2007) also pointed 
out that not only neonatal and postnatal, but also prenatal (or fetal) conditions (such 
as undernutrition in utero) might contribute substantially to the development of coro-
nary heart diseases in later life.
Since some countries experienced relatively large gains in life expectancy even 
with little or no economic growth, Cutler et al. (2006) argued that economic conditions 
play only a marginal role in mortality improvements. They instead attributed these 
improvements primarily to advances in health-related technologies, which may influ-
ence both health and income. For instance, Chinese life expectancy increased rapidly 
between 1950 and 1970, despite the low levels of growth in income per capita in China 
during that period (Wang 2011). These substantial survival improvements have mainly 
been attributed to factors like increased economic equality (due to a socialist welfare 
system), improved public health care, and the spread of modern health and medical 
knowledge (Wang 2011, p. 177). However, other scholars have questioned the asso-
ciation between income inequality and life expectancy, pointing out that the results 
strongly depend on the selected countries, time periods, and sources of income data 
(Lynch and Smith 2002; Mackenbach 2002). For instance, Lynch et al. (2001), using 
data of better quality, found little (or no) evidence for the association between income 
inequality and mortality differences in 16 wealthy countries.
Crises are processes that abruptly transform the social, economic, and/or political 
structure of a population. Because these transitions are often unexpected and allow 
people little time to prepare, they tend to induce a sense of insecurity. Such crises 
occurred, for example, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s; and in the War-
saw Pact states in the 1990s. Moreover, in the wake of the financial crisis of the 
late 2000s, similar crises are currently unfolding in countries like Greece and Spain. 
Mackenbach et al. (2013) analyzed the impact of democratization on life expectancy: 
in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, survival improvements were immediately recog-
nizable after the transformation from military dictatorship to full democracy in the 
1970s; whereas in the 1990s in the countries of the former Soviet Union and its satel-
lite states, it took longer for survival improvements to emerge because the transfor-
mation affected not only political, but also economic and social dimensions. While 
the Baltic countries successively democratized and joined the European Union, other 
countries like the Russian Federation experienced a kind of reversion to the previous 
(political and economic) conditions (Mackenbach et al. 2013). The diverse facets of 
the mortality crisis in these transitional countries have been described in detail in 
Cornia and Panacciá (2000a, b), who have provided relevant background informa-
tion on the region as a whole, as well as on individual countries. In addition, they 
have explained and discussed the causative conditions that most affected vulnerable 
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people, as well as the policy approaches used to tackle such transformation processes. 
Meslé (2004) and Grigoriev et al. (2010) have also pointed out that the effects of the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union varied across central and eastern European 
countries depending on their initial conditions, including their industrial structure 
and their levels of income and human capital (Popov 2007, 2009). In the early 1990s, 
radical economic and political reforms led to substantial increases in mortality in 
Russia and Lithuania, whereas the more modest economic and political changes in 
Belarus during this period resulted in smaller increases in mortality (Grigoriev et al. 
2010). It is also striking that the mortality increases in Russia mainly occurred among 
men of working age, many of whom were unemployed, poorly educated, unmar-
ried, and living in urban areas. These deaths were largely due to excessive alcohol 
consumption, accidents, and cardiovascular diseases; and were less likely to occur 
among the very young and the very old, the groups who are usually most affected by 
such crises (Leon 2007; Shkolnikov and Cornia 2000; Shkolnikov et al. 2004). The 
well-being of a population in terms of their economic prospects and health status 
depends not only on the speed of economic liberalization and democratization, direct 
foreign investment (including mass privatization (Stuckler et al. 2009)), and free 
trade, but also on the willingness of policy-makers and the polity to pursue strategies 
that meet the country’s specific requirements (Popov 2007, 2009).
Even today, health and mortality conditions might be influenced by financial (and 
economic) crises. For instance, Bernal et al. (2013) and Roca et al. (2013) have pro-
vided evidence that suicides and mental disorders have increased in Spain since the 
beginning of the financial crisis of the late 2000s, and that people of working ages 
have been hit particularly hard by very large increases in unemployment. According 
to data from the UN (The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of the Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) 2014), the unemployment rate in Spain 
increased for both men and women from 9.63 % in the first quarter in 2008 to 26.03 % 
in the fourth quarter in 2013. Kentikelenis et al. (2011, 2012) showed similar effects 
for Greece, reporting not only an increase in suicide, but also in psychiatric morbid-
ity. The cross-sectional studies of Bobak et al. (1998, 2000) have provided empirical 
evidence for Russia that following the abrupt transition to democracy and capitalism 
in the 1990s, rising income inequality, a deteriorating social safety net, and increas-
ing levels of material hardship have resulted in greater psychosocial stress among the 
population; and that this stress in turn led to higher levels of morbidity and premature 
deaths. Thus, it appears that a perceived loss of control over one’s life, especially 
when coupled with material deprivation, has strong effects on self-reported health.
Although the financial crisis of the late 2000s resulted in increased levels of eco-
nomic insecurity in many countries, not all countries and not all individuals were 
equally affected. Since young adults appear to be particularly vulnerable to rising 
unemployment rates, healthy and mobile young people may be motivated to emigrate 
to countries which offer them better job opportunities. Receiving countries such as 
Germany might benefit from an influx of young, healthy, and highly educated immi-
grants; while sending countries such as Spain could suffer from this brain drain. 
These migration flows could also have effects on life expectancy: while receiving 
countries might experience gains in life expectancy due to the healthy migrant effect, 
the sending countries might experience decreases in life expectancy.
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3  Methodological considerations on mortality forecasting
The fact that (record) human lifespans are continuously expanding suggests that mor-
tality tends to evolve according to a fairly regular pattern, even though the substantial 
differences that emerge both between countries and within countries over time seem 
to imply that mortality rates are volatile (see Fig. 1). Analyzing mortality disaggre-
gated by age and sex reinforces this latter impression, since it reveals changes in age-
specific mortality that differ in their direction as well as in their intensity over time. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the death rates (top row), as well as their rates of improve-
ment (bottom row); i.e., the time derivative of the age-specific death rates, in percent 
for women and men in Spain (left), Hungary (center), and Russia (right) from 1950 
to 2009 on so-called Lexis surfaces by calendar time and age. Since a 1 year increase 
in age is equivalent to a 1year increase in time, each birth cohort is represented by a 
45-degree line. Gradually declining death rates are indicated by successively increas-
ing contour lines, which represent how a certain mortality level (of, for instance, 
0.01) dynamically shifts to older ages with time. Such mortality declines are caused 
by survival improvements, which we depict as the rates of mortality improvement. 
Strong survival improvements (of more than 4 %) are shown in red and yellow; while 
minor and moderate survival improvements (of more than 0.5 % and less than 4 %) are 
shown in blue and green. Stagnating mortality (between − 0.5 and + 0.5 %) is depicted 
in white, and increasing mortality (up to − 5 %) is illustrated in gray and black. The 
age-specific death rates—and, to an even greater degree, their corresponding rates of 
improvement—in Spain, Hungary, and Russia clearly show that the developments in 
mortality in these countries have been volatile, often as a result of the period effects 
of political, social and/or economic crises:
Spain: Relative to other countries, Spain experienced some of the largest gains in 
life expectancy between 1950 and 2009 (see Fig. 1). These gains occurred because 
of relatively large reductions in mortality at different ages over t gray and black ime. 
Particularly remarkable are the relatively moderate and strong survival improvements 
(green and red rates of mortality improvement in Figs. 3 and 4) at almost all ages in 
the 1960s, a period in which Spain experienced an unprecedented level of economic 
growth, also known as the Spanish miracle; as well as in the 1970s, a period in which 
Spain transitioned from Franco’s dictatorship to democracy.
Hungary: Hungary gained far fewer additional years of life than Spain between 
1950 and 2009, and experienced periods of stagnating and slightly decreasing life 
expectancy (at least for men) between 1960 and 1995; this pattern is similar to those 
observed in many central and eastern European countries, and is often attributed to an 
ineffective health care system and unhealthy lifestyles (regarding alcohol consump-
tion and tobacco use). This trend of increasing mortality reversed about 5 years after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Hungarian life expectancy has since caught 
up to international trends. Increased investments in the health care system, including 
improved medical treatments and prevention efforts, along with declines in cardio-
vascular mortality appear to be the driving forces behind these recent gains (Balogh 
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Fig. 3 (Smoothed) Death rates (upper panel) and their corresponding rates of mortality improvement in 
% (lower panel) for women in Spain (left; a, d), Hungary (center; b, e), and Russia (right; c, f) from 1950 
to 2009
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Fig. 4 (Smoothed) Death rates (upper panel) and their corresponding rates of mortality improvement in 
% (lower panel) for men in Spain (left; a, d), Hungary (center; b, e), and Russia (right; c, f) from 1950 
to 2009
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et al. 2010; Meslé 2004), and differentiate Hungary from Russia (Shkolnikov et al. 
2004).
Russia: The development of Russian life expectancy between 1950 and 2009 is 
characterized by considerable volatility, including periods of decreasing, stagnating, 
and increasing mortality. In contrast to Hungary, Russia experienced not just a slight, 
but a sharp increase in mortality in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union among people of all ages (gray and black rates of mortality improvement). 
Russian life expectancy did not start to increase again until 2005, almost 10 years 
after Hungary began to register improvements. Currently, life expectancy levels in 
Russia continue to lag far behind those of other European countries. According to 
Shkolnikov et al. (2004), the persistence of this large gap in life expectancy until the 
mid-2000s is attributable to many decades of relatively low levels of investment and 
a lack of technological innovation in the health care system; along with excessive 
alcohol consumption, tobacco use, and relatively high levels of psychosocial stress, 
which are linked to a high rate of premature death. Although improvements in the 
health care system have since been made and the numbers of premature (cardiovas-
cular and external) deaths have declined since 2005, Shkolnikov et al. (2013) pointed 
out that it is still unclear whether the recent progress in Russian life expectancy can 
be sustained in the future, and whether these positive developments mean that Russia 
is finally catching up to international trends.
In spite of these ups and downs, a regular pattern of mortality decline is clearly 
visible in all three countries. This pattern is most evident in the dynamic shift in 
mortality from younger to older ages, the trend which has contributed the most to 
improvements in life expectancy. While political, social, and/or economic crises 
have slowed this development for certain periods of time, they have not changed the 
general direction. Since these relatively large survival improvements have not yet 
affected the oldest-old in any of these three countries, we expect this dynamic age 
shift will continue in the future, leading to further gains in life expectancy.
Given these diverse mortality developments, a model used to generate precise and 
plausible mortality forecasts must meet at least three criteria. First, a mortality fore-
casting approach should be able to model dynamic age shifts (in survival improve-
ments from younger to older ages). Second, it should be able to model fundamental 
changes in long-term trends (due to substantial transformation processes). Third, it 
should be able to incorporate how probable each potential mortality development 
actually is. If a model meets all of these criteria, it is technically/methodologically 
equipped to forecast regular as well as irregular mortality developments. This is, 
however, no guarantee of accurate mortality forecasts, since some events are (and 
will be) unexpected.
Today, providing probability statements for mortality forecasts is considered the 
state-of-the-art. Modeling dynamic age shifts in mortality reductions and funda-
mental changes in long-term trends remains challenging. Many mortality forecast-
ing approaches simply extrapolate past trends, and are therefore severely limited 
when it comes to including dynamic age shifts or turning points in long-term trends. 
For instance, the widely applied Lee-Carter model (Lee and Carter 1992) extrapo-
lates death rates by age on the logarithmic scale. Although this approach can model 
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improving survival, it assumes that relative mortality changes among ages and among 
adjacent years remain constant over time. As these strong constraints are implausible, 
large errors in the forecasts generated are likely, especially in the long run. Mitchell 
(2013) and Haberman and Renshaw (2012) tried to overcome this inflexibility by 
taking (and extending) the predictor structure of the original Lee-Carter model in 
order to forecast the rates of mortality improvement instead of the death rates. This 
procedure allowed them to capture relative mortality changes more flexibly and to 
model dynamic age shifts, which is one reason why we also have chosen to use the 
rates of mortality improvement in our mortality forecasting model.
Countries like Spain, Hungary, and Russia experienced mortality developments 
that were interrupted by periods of sharp mortality declines or survival improve-
ments due to major transformation processes. Forecasting such unsteady mortality 
developments is particularly challenging, because turning points in long-term trends 
are often unexpected and do not naturally emerge from the past; instead, these turning 
points tend to occur abruptly due to radical changes in essential areas of a society. So-
called coherent approaches might allow us to capture such long-term trends. These 
approaches jointly forecast mortality trends among multiple (sub)populations. For 
instance, Li and Lee (2005) and Cairns et al. (2011) have suggested the sharing of 
mortality trends among a group of countries that are connected through geographical, 
social, economic, political, or cultural proximity. If a country experiences a smaller 
increase in life expectancy than the group of countries to which it is similar, a coher-
ent model might forecast a larger increase in life expectancy for this country than 
would otherwise have been generated, based on the assumption that the country will 
likely catch up to the broader trend. Hence, a coherent forecast can alter long-term 
trends due to the inclusion of information from other related countries. This is a rea-
son why our model also allows us to use the mortality trends of selected reference 
countries as additional information.
The above-mentioned requirements served as a basis for the development of our 
model (Bohk and Rau 2014a), which can be used to generate probabilistic fore-
casts for populations experiencing regular as well as irregular mortality trajectories. 
Instead of using a simple regression model with dummies accounting for crises, we 
combined recently developed concepts to forecast mortality: our model can capture 
dynamic age shifts in mortality reductions via rates of mortality improvement, and it 
can capture major changes in long-term trends by optionally complementing mortal-
ity trends in a country of interest with those of selected reference countries. We use 
Bayesian inference and simulation-based Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to pro-
cess our hierarchical models, which provide a predictive outcome distribution with 
probability statements for all possible mortality developments in order to capture and 
quantify forecasting uncertainty.
4  Mortality forecasting in practice
We have already applied our model successfully in retrospective and prospective 
mortality forecast designs for Great Britain and Denmark (Bohk and Rau 2014a) as 
well as for Italy, Spain, Sweden, and West Germany (Bohk and Rau 2014b). How-
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ever, since the purpose of this paper is to show how our model can be used to fore-
cast irregular mortality developments, here we have generated mortality forecasts for 
Spain, Hungary, and Russia.
4.1  Retrospective mortality forecasts
In the retrospective setting, we forecast mortality by single age and sex from 1991 to 
2009, given data from 1965 to 1990. We determine that the base period (1965–1990) 
ends at the point in time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which also marked the 
start of political, social, and economic crises in Hungary and Russia. Hence, these retro-
spective forecasts can show how forecasting models are able to capture major changes 
in long-term mortality trends: in the case of Hungary, an upward trend in life expec-
tancy; and in the case of Russia, a downward trend in life expectancy (at least until 
2005). To enable comparability, we use the same base period (1965–1990) for Spain.
To assess the forecasting performance of our model, we use forecast errors that 
quantify the difference between forecasted and observed mortality data; we then use 
these forecast errors to compare the forecasting performance of our model with the 
performances of other renowned models, in particular with the original Lee-Carter 
model (1992) and its coherent variant (Li and Lee 2005). To generate the retrospec-
tive mortality forecasts with the Lee-Carter model (1992), we use its freely available 
implementation, written by Timothy Miller. For the forecasts with the coherent Lee-
Carter variant of Li and Lee (2005), we use the web-based platform LCFIT.
Since both our model and the coherent Lee-Carter model can jointly forecast the 
mortality trends of multiple populations, we use Portugal as a reference country for 
Spain, eastern and western Germany as reference countries for Hungary, and Belarus 
as a reference country for Russia.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 depict the observed (black line) and forecasted life expectancy 
of our model (blue line), of the original Lee-Carter model (red line), and of its coher-
ent variant (green line) for both sexes in Spain, Hungary, and Russia. In addition, we 
assess the retrospective mortality forecasts with forecast errors and mean absolute 
errors (MAEs), which are also depicted in those figures. Forecast errors quantify the 
difference between forecasted and observed life expectancy in every year; they mea-
sure bias, since they can be greater or less than zero, indicating whether a forecast sys-
tematically over- or underestimates observed life expectancy. In contrast, the MAEs 
measure accuracy, since they are the mean of the absolute forecast errors over all 
years, only taking the number of deviations into account, irrespective of whether they 
are positive or negative. While the models perform almost equally well in the case 
of Spain, their performance differs considerably in the cases of Hungary and Russia.
Spain: The female mortality forecasts of our model and of the original Lee-Carter 
model fluctuate narrowly around the observed life expectancy in Spain, resulting in 
small MAEs that range from 0.15 to 0.2. Only the coherent Lee-Carter model slightly 
underestimates female life expectancy, a fact that is indicated by negative forecast 
errors and a slightly larger MAE of 0.64. For men, all of the models underestimate 
the sharp increase in observed life expectancy from 1990 onward, but our model 
generates a smaller MAE, of 0.56, than the Lee-Carter model and its coherent variant, 
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which produce MAEs of 1.10 and 1.41, respectively. Since the long-term mortality 
trend did not change substantially among women in the forecast years, all of the 
models can capture future developments for women quite well. Small difficulties 
appear only among men, for whom the upward trend in life expectancy intensifies/
accelerates in the forecast years.
Fig. 5 Left: Observed life expectancy at birth (black line) as well as its retrospective forecasts of our 
model (blue line), of the original Lee-Carter model (red line) and of its coherent variant (green line) for 
women (top) and men (bottom) in Spain. We take data from 1965 to 1990 (gray square) to forecast mor-
tality from 1991 to 2009. Center: Annual forecast errors for each model. Error indicates that forecasting 
models were run, but generated an error message. Right: Mean of the absolute forecast errors (MAE) over 
all forecast years for each model
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Hungary: While the forecasts of our model reflect the actual development of Hun-
garian life expectancy for women and men with only small deviations, the other 
models (1) generate larger forecast errors or (2) have problems forecasting Hungarian 
mortality at all. For instance, the female forecast errors of the coherent Lee-Carter 
model gradually decline from + 2.4 in 1991 to − 1.6 in 2009, resulting in a MAE of 
1.22. The fact that there is already a relatively large deviation in the jump-off year 
indicates that the coherent model has problems pooling countries like Hungary with 
Fig. 6 Left: Observed life expectancy at birth (black line) as well as its retrospective forecasts of our 
model (blue line), of the original Lee-Carter model (red line) and of its coherent variant (green line) for 
women (top) and men (bottom) in Hungary. We take data from 1965 to 1990 (gray square) to forecast 
mortality from 1991 to 2009. Center: Annual forecast errors for each model. Error indicates that forecast-
ing models were run, but generated an error message. Right: Mean of the absolute forecast errors (MAE) 
over all forecast years for each model
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countries like eastern and western Germany, which have quite different mortality 
levels. This also demonstrates that our model uses mortality information from other 
countries in a similar, but still different way than the coherent Lee-Carter model: 
while our model uses mortality trends of other countries to model (successively 
evolving) major changes in long-term trends for a country of interest, the coherent 
Lee-Carter model jointly forecasts the mortality of populations with similar mortality 
levels (due to, for example, cultural proximity). Forecasting Hungarian mortality is 
Fig. 7 Left: Observed life expectancy at birth (black line) as well as its retrospective forecasts of our 
model (blue line), of the original Lee-Carter model (red line) and of its coherent variant (green line) for 
women (top) and men (bottom) in Russia. We take data from 1965 to 1990 (gray square) to forecast mor-
tality from 1991 to 2009. Center: Annual forecast errors for each model. Error indicates that forecasting 
models were run, but generated an error message. Right: Mean of the absolute forecast errors (MAE) over 
all forecast years for each model
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especially challenging among men, since they experienced a radical change around 
the jump-off year (due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union): after declining for 
many years (in the base period), male life expectancy starts to increase sharply in the 
forecast years. This abrupt shift caused severe estimation problems for some models, 
including the original Lee-Carter model.
Russia: Since the development of Russian life expectancy was extremely volatile 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, including periods of sharp declines and 
smaller increases, all of the models generated relatively large forecast errors, overes-
timating the real development and resulting in MAEs that ranged from 1.9 to 2.3 for 
women and from 3.1 to 4.5 for men. Although our model overestimates Russian life 
expectancy to a greater extent than the other models, it is important to note that the 
selection of the base period has a large impact in this forecast setting. To show how 
sensitive the results are to the chosen base period, Fig. 8 depicts retrospective mortal-
ity forecasts, based on data from 1975 to 1990 (rather than 1965 to 1990). It is clear 
that both our model and the Lee-Carter model overestimate Russian life expectancy, 
but now they do so to a similar extent, since the MAEs of both models range from 2.2 
to 2.4 for women and from 4.5 to 4.6 for men. Hence, extremely volatile mortality 
developments—like those observed among Russian males after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union—are difficult to predict at all, and it seems that generating an accurate 
forecast depends more on luck than on methodology and expertise.
4.2  Prospective mortality forecasts
In the prospective setting, we employ our model to forecast mortality from 2010 to 
2050, based on data from 1965 to 2009. We use (1) no reference country for Spain; 
(2) eastern and western Germany as reference countries for Hungary; and (3) the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary as reference countries for Russia, based on 
the assumption that Hungary and Russia are likely to catch up to international trends. 
We also expect that Hungary is likely to progress faster than Russia due to its greater 
political and economic proximity to highly developed countries in the European 
Union. Figure 9 and Table 1 depict the median point estimates, as well as the 50, 
67, 80, and 95 % prediction intervals for female and male life expectancy in Spain, 
Hungary, and Russia from 2010 to 2050.
Median point estimates. Our model clearly forecasts increasing life expectancy for 
both sexes in all three countries, although progress is projected to be greater (1) 
among men than among women, and (2) among Hungarians than among Russians 
and Spaniards. For instance, while Hungarian men can expect to gain 13.5 additional 
years of life up to 2050, Russian men can expect to increase their life expectancy by 
13 years, and Spanish men by 10 years. Advances are expected to be only slightly 
smaller among women: in Hungary and Russia, women can expect to gain 11 years, 
while in Spain they can expect to gain nine additional years of life up to 2050. These 
findings also suggest that the mortality gap between women and men will narrow, 
because men are more likely to catch up to the lower mortality levels of women than 
women are to experience additional progress at even more advanced ages. This is 
288 C. Bohk, R. Rau
1 3
especially the case in Hungary and Russia, the two countries in our forecast setting 
in which men experienced higher mortality during the social, political, and economic 
transformation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite the larger projected 
gains in life expectancy in Hungary and Russia, Spain is likely to continue to have 
the highest life expectancy among the selected countries: in 2050, life expectancy is 
projected to reach 93.84 years for women and 88.51 years for men in Spain, but only 
Fig. 8 Left: Observed life expectancy at birth (black line) as well as its retrospective forecasts of our 
model (blue line), of the original Lee-Carter model (red line) and of its coherent variant (green line) 
for women (top) and men (bottom) in Russia. We take data from 1975 to 1990 (gray square) in order to 
forecast mortality from 1991 to 2009. Center: Forecast errors; i.e., differences between forecasted and 
observed life expectancy, for each forecast year and model. Error indicates that forecasting models have 
been run, but have generated an error message. Right: Mean of the absolute forecast errors (MAE) over all 
of the forecast years for each forecast model
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89.34 years for women and 84.09 years for men in Hungary, and just 85.83 years for 
women and 75.97 years for men in Russia.
Forecast uncertainty. The gradually widening prediction intervals indicate growing 
uncertainty over time. For instance, the life expectancy of Hungarian men will range 
with a probability of 95 % from 71.15 to 75.18 years in 2020 and from 73.71 to 88.57 
years in 2050. Thus, the uncertainty range almost quadruples from 4 to 15 years in 
only 30 forecast years. Moreover, our model assigns larger degrees of uncertainty to 
male than to female mortality forecasts. This is in part because male life expectancy 
developed less regularly than female life expectancy in the base period, an effect that 
is particularly pronounced in Russia: while the 95 % prediction interval includes 18 
years for Russian males and 13 years for Russian females in 2050, it only comprises 
15 years for men and 12 years for women in Hungary, and 13 years for men and 10 
years for women in Spain.
Table 1 Estimates from our model: Forecasted quantiles 0.025, 0.5, and 0.975 for female (“F”) and male 
(“M”) life expectancy at birth in Spain, Hungary, and Russia for the years 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, and 
2050
Country Quantile Year
   2010    2020   2030    2040    2050
F M F M F M F M F M
Spain 0.025 84.63 78.55 85.32 79.25 85.97 79.93 86.58 80.60 87.18 81.27
0.5 84.8 78.73 87.13 81.21 89.39 83.64 91.62 86.07 93.84 88.51
0.975 84.87 78.86 87.98 82.66 91.08 86.44 94.18 90.20 97.18 93.86
Hungary 0.025 78.31 70.29 79.16 71.15 79.98 72.01 80.78 72.86 81.56 73.71
0.5 78.51 70.54 81.39 73.97 84.16 77.43 86.82 80.81 89.34 84.09
0.975 78.60 70.65 82.39 75.18 86.16 79.74 89.89 84.24 93.53 88.57
Russia 0.025 74.79 62.82 75.71 63.77 76.56 64.67 77.36 65.55 78.12 66.40
0.5 74.98 63.04 77.75 66.21 80.45 69.38 83.13 72.62 85.83 75.97
0.975 75.11 63.25 79.26 68.55 83.33 73.88 87.37 79.21 91.34 84.47
Fig. 9 Observed (black) and forecasted life expectancy at birth of our model for women (red) and men 
(blue) in Spain (left), Hungary (center), and Russia (right). We take data from 1965 to 2009 (gray square) 
in order to forecast mortality from 2010 to 2050. The width of the 80, 67, and 50 % prediction intervals—
which gradually lighten as they move toward the median point estimates (dashed lines)—gives an impres-
sion of how uncertain the future development of mortality is
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Although our model forecasts that life expectancy will increase for women and 
men in Spain, Hungary, and Russia, it is important to keep in mind that these results 
will be valid only if the underlying assumptions turn out to be accurate.
5  Summary and concluding remarks
How do economic conditions in general, and major economic changes in particu-
lar, influence mortality; and which methodological features does a model need to be 
able to predict the resulting mortality developments? Although many studies have 
investigated the impact of economic conditions on mortality levels, the direction, 
the intensity, and even the existence of this relationship continue to be debated. Nev-
ertheless, major transformation processes, including those resulting from economic 
and political reforms, appear to have an effect on life expectancy, especially if the 
changes are radical and rapid, and affect people in unexpected ways in multiple areas 
of life. These crises are often accompanied by rising income inequality, a deteriora-
tion in the social safety net, and material hardship; which in turn lead to increasing 
levels of psychosocial stress, and temporary periods of stagnating and even declin-
ing life expectancy. Spain, Hungary, and Russia experienced such irregular mortality 
developments due to radical socioeconomic and/or political changes. For instance, 
life expectancy declined in Hungary and Russia in the early 1990s following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, whereas Spain experienced large survival improve-
ments in the 1970s following a transition to a democratic regime. Today, Spain is still 
feeling the effects of the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which caused, inter alia, 
high unemployment rates and thus high levels of social and economic insecurity—
issues that raise the question of whether past increases in Spanish life expectancy are 
likely to continue into the future.
Irregular mortality developments are particularly difficult to forecast due to major 
changes in long-term trends. Many mortality forecasting approaches, such as the 
original Lee-Carter model (1992), cannot adequately incorporate trend reversals, 
since the model is based on the assumption that relative mortality changes among 
ages and among adjacent years are time-invariant. Recently developed approaches 
have attempted to overcome these shortcomings. For instance, Mitchell (2013) and 
Haberman and Renshaw (2012) suggested forecasting the rates of mortality improve-
ment (rather than the death rates) in order to model flexible changes in survival over 
age and time. Li and Lee (2005) and Cairns et al. (2011) recommended jointly fore-
casting the mortality of multiple (sub)populations in so-called coherent mortality 
forecasts, which allows the user to adjust the mortality trend in each country using 
mortality information of other countries. We adopted these new approaches in our 
mortality forecasting model (Bohk and Rau 2014a), which can (1) model dynamic 
shifts in survival improvements from younger to older ages (using the rates of mor-
tality improvement), and (2) adjust the mortality trend in a country of interest using 
information from selected reference countries.
We have employed our model to forecast irregular mortality in Spain, Hungary, 
and Russia, both retrospectively from 1991 to 2009; and prospectively from 2010 to 
2050. While the prospective results suggest that life expectancy is likely to increase 
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in all three countries, and that the degree of uncertainty is greater for men than for 
women (because male mortality fluctuated more strongly in the past), the retrospec-
tive results suggest that our model can forecast irregular mortality with changing 
long-term trends, and that its forecast errors are usually smaller than those of other 
applied models, such as the original Lee-Carter model (1992) or its coherent variant 
(Li and Lee 2005). However, the forecasting performance of our model is limited 
(like that of every model): if mortality developments become extremely volatile—as 
was the case in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union—it seems that gen-
erating a precise forecast will depend more on luck than on methodology and expert 
judgment. That is why all of the retrospective forecasts of Russian life expectancy 
differ significantly from the observed mortality developments, whereas the models 
generated considerably smaller forecast errors for Hungary (and Spain). This may be 
in part because, like Russia, Hungary experienced a multidimensional crisis after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in which mortality increased temporarily; whereas, 
unlike Russia, Hungary continued to move toward democracy and capitalism. Hun-
gary has registered large increases in life expectancy since the mid-1990s, largely due 
to increasing investments in the health care system, which in turn led to a reduction in 
the numbers of premature death due to alcohol consumption, tobacco use, and acci-
dents; and in mortality from cardiovascular disease. In Russia, these developments 
appear to have occurred 10 years later (Shkolnikov et al. 2013).
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings regarding the effects of eco-
nomic changes on mortality and its predictability? Although we think that there is 
no ultimate answer to the questions raised here, we conclude that economic changes 
appear to have minor effects on life expectancy in industrialized countries, but that 
their impact increases if they occur in conjunction with other major social and politi-
cal changes. Regarding predictability, we conclude that while our model can catch 
turning points in long-term trends more precisely than many other models, if these 
radical changes occur frequently within short intervals of time, they can neither be 
anticipated nor forecasted by an expert and/or model.
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